Joint Operating Agreements: An International Comparison from Petroleum Law by Black, Alexander J. & Dundas, Hew R.
Journal of Natural Resources & 
Environmental Law 
Volume 8 
Issue 1 Journal of Natural Resources & 
Environmental Law, Volume 8, Issue 1 
Article 6 
January 1992 
Joint Operating Agreements: An International Comparison from 
Petroleum Law 
Alexander J. Black 
University of Glasgow 
Hew R. Dundas 
Cairn Energy PLC 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jnrel 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Black, Alexander J. and Dundas, Hew R. (1992) "Joint Operating Agreements: An International 
Comparison from Petroleum Law," Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law: Vol. 8 : Iss. 1 , 
Article 6. 
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jnrel/vol8/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For 
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
Joint Operating Agreements:
An International Comparison From
Petroleum Law
ALEXANDER J. BLACK* AND HEw R. DUNDAS**
Joint Operating Agreements ("JOAs") are often used in
capital-intensive resource industries by parties who wish to re-
strict their exposure, particularly in limiting costs or liability.
Investment prudence in these industries necessitates a mix of
participants who contribute some or all of the financing, intel-
ligence, access to market or privileged access to the project itself.
Typically, standard form documents provide the terms in JOAs
where the venture is one of a recurring nature.
This article examines elements of JOAs as they relate to the
United Kingdom Continental Shelf ("UKCS") industry, con-
trasting these with American, Canadian, Australian and New
Zealand petroleum law practice. After a brief history of JOAs,
the paper reviews several areas of concern: control of joint
operations, fiduciary duties, change of operator and production
in kind. The paper also discusses the extent of a participant's
interest, liabilities of operators, default clauses, abandonment,
and several other issues. A final section investigates the future
of JOAs, concentrating on their current problems and prospects
in resource industries.
I. THE SCOPE OF JOAs
JOAs have existed at least since the first oil field was dis-
covered by Colonel Drake in the 1860s. Widely used in the
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resources industry, a JOA typically involves two or more natural
or legal persons combining property and expertise to carry out
a single business enterprise in which they have a joint proprietary
interest, a joint right to control and a sharing of profits and
losses.' Conceptually, a JOA comprises the "constitution" which
governs the joint venture and it is functionally akin to a part-
nership or limited partnership agreement or to the Memorandum
and Articles of Association of a company.2 A joint venture (or
"joint adventure") is "an association of persons for the prose-
cution of a single venture." 3 The usual elements of a joint
venture include:
1. community interest in the object of the undertaking;
2. pro-rata right to direct and govern the conduct of each other
with respect thereto;
3. share to the extent of their respective percentage interest in
the losses or profits;
4. close, possibly fiduciary, relationship between the parties.4
Many early JOAs were based on North American forms such as
the American Association of Petroleum Landsmen's (AAPL)
Model Form Operating Agreement and the Canadian Association
of Petroleum Landsmen's (CAPL) Operating Procedure. The
AAPL developed a model form JOA in the 1950s known as
Form 610-1956 which subsequenty became accepted industry-
wide.' This was revised in 1977, with the current model being
610-1982. In Canada, the CAPL devised proforma agreements
in 1969, 1971, 1974 and 1981. In 1990, the latest standard form
of operating procedure was produced, with one of its main
objectives being a re-balancing of the needs of the different
parties to the agreement.
6
While the AAPL model formed the basis for many of the
early U.K. JOAs, the forms of agreements entered into were
Maliss v. Bankers Trust Co., 717 F.2d 683 (1983).
2 MICtAEL P. G. TAYLOR, P. P. WENSoR & SALLY M. TYNE, THE JOINT OPERATING
AGREEMENT: OIL AND GAS LAW 3 (1989).
1 Beck v. Cagle, 46 Cal. App. 2d 152, 115 P.2d 613 (1941). A useful guide to
joint ventures in general is DRFIrrNG INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENTS (1991).
4 Beck v. Cagle, 115 P.2d at 613.
See Marvin L. Wigley, A.A.P.L Form 610-1977 Model Form Operating Agree-
meni, 24 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 693, 697 (1978) ("The A.A.P.L. Model Form
became, without question, the most widely accepted and most often used in the indus-
try").
, JAMES O'BYRNa, 1990 CAPL OPERATING PROCEDURE IN OIL & GAS OPERATING
AGREEMENTS: CONVENTIONAL, FRONTIER AND INTERNATIONAL (1991) (hereinafter LESA).
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still quite diverse. In 1976, under the guidance of the U.K.
Offshore Operators Association ("UKOOA"), a working group
of in-house lawyers drafted a model form JOA. In the fifth
round of UKCS offshore licensing in 1977, licenses were granted,
conditioned in part on the licensees excluding JOAs with the
state-owned British National Oil Corporation ("BNOC") in an
acceptable form. BNOC reviewed the 1976 UKOOA draft and
produced7 what is now known as the "BNOC Proforma Joint
Operating Agreement for Fifth Round Licences." This has sig-
nificantly influenced the form of subsequent UKCS JOAs, but
no standard form U.K. JOA exists which parallels that in North
America. According to one analyst,
The imposition of the 5th and 6th round proforma JOAs [by]
BNOC was resented by the Oil Industry at the time. It is a
testament to the skill of the draftsmen of the BNOC proformas
that, over ten years later, new JOAs still bear more than a
passing resemblance to the BNOC 5th round proforma.8
Since 1976 it has been necessary to obtain the approval of the
Secretary of State to the terms of all new joint operating agree-
ments and to alterations to ones already in existence 9 prior to
commencing operations. Failure to obtain such approval makes
the licence revocable without any right of appeal.10
JOAs typically specify that, among the parties, the relation-
ship is one of tenants in common and not one of partnership.'
In the U.K., such a provision is essential for tax reasons. The
arrangement should also be distinguished from a mining part-
nership or from a unitization agreement since it is not normally
intended to affect the ownership of the minerals with the rights
to produce. JOAs are sometimes confused with the broader so-
called "joint venture" label:
I use the phrase "Joint Venture" not in the sense of suggesting
that in this case there was anything in the way of a legal
This occurred in conjunction with a leading firm of London Solicitors.
Taylor et al., supra note 2, at 5-6.
9 There was a lacuna in the 1966 Regulations, cured by Model Clause 39(5) of
the Petroleum (Production) (Seaward Areas) Regulations 1976 (S.I. 1976/1129), which
is currently model clause 41((5) of the 1988 Regulations (S.I. 1988/1213); any reference
to Model Clauses is to the 1988 Regulations unless specified otherwise. Note that the
Model Clauses refer to the "Minister."
10 Model Clause 42(5) Petroleum (Production) (Seaward Areas) Regulations 1976
(S.I. 1976/1129).
" A. LucAs & C. Htur, OIL AND GAs LAW IN CANADA 165 (1990).
1992-93]
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partnership between the plaintiff and the defendant but merely
to describe what perhaps some ordinary person might think of
the relationship between the two. 2
Therefore, a joint operation can be carried on by a JOA, joint
venture, partnership, corporation or trust with different legal
implications attaching respectively to ownership of the minerals
and to the rights to produce them. In the U.S., JOAs do not
create a separate tax entity. 3 Hence, the proprietary interests in
the JOA is characterized by the law of co-tenancy. A co-tenant
cannot claim part of the property to the exclusion of other co-
tenants, each being liable to the other both for waste and for
receiving more than each co-tenant's share.
14
II. CONTROL OF JOINT OPERATIONS
Petroleum in situ in the U.K. is vested in the Crown pursuant
to the Petroleum (Production) Act 1934,15 empowering 6 the
Secretary of State for Energy 17 to issue licenses "to search and
bore for, and get, petroleum." These provisions have been ex-
tended to the U.K. territorial sea and continental shelf while
similar provisions are to be found in Section 1(7) of the Conti-
nental Shelf Act 19641 and Section 18 of the Oil and Gas
(Enterprise) Act 1982.19 The form of licence is contractual, ex-
ecuted as a deed between the Secretary of State and the licensee.
The licensee grants an exclusive right to search, bore for, and
remove petroleum from the sea-bed and sub-soil under the rel-
evant block. It has been further suggested this constitutes an in
rem right. However, the licence, although contractual in form,
also performs significant regulatory functions.
20
UKCS licenses make reference to "licensee" in the singular,
although this entity may include co-licensees whose obligations
Inglefield v. Macey 2 KIR 146, (1967).
HowARD R. WiLLMs & CtRLEs J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS TERMS 490 (7th ed.,
1987).
, Statute of Westminster (1285), Statute of 4 Ann (1705).
" Petroleum (Production) Act 1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, clause 36.
Id. at 2
17 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry from April 1992, folowing the elimi-
nation of the Department of Energy as a separate entity.
11 Continental Shelf Act 1964 clause 29.
19 Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act 1982 clause 23.
- Contained in Model Clauses 14-15, 17-33, 35-36 and 40-42; the other clauses are
contractual in nature; see also Alexander J. Black, Comparative Licensing Aspects of
Canadian & United Kingdom Petroleum Law, 21 Tex. lnt.L.J.471 (1986).
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under the licence are joint and several. However, licences are
silent about the bargain inter se of the co-licensees. 2' While the
licence notionally establishes a joint tenancy, the JOA percentage
interest clause22 effectively severs a joint tenancy and imputes to
each of the participants as tenants in common with an undivided
interest in the licence commensurate with its percentage interest.
Pursuant to Section 2(1) of the Partnership Act licensees are
regarded as co-owners of the license and of any petroleum won
and saved under that license. 23
In the UKCS "won" refers to the winning of access to
minerals prior to the start of the extraction process and "save"
means "brought into possession under control and that, as re-
gards the extraction of petroleum, this stage is reached either
when the petroleum has passed the well-head or when it has
passed through the initial separation and stabilization processes
on the production platform". 2 4
The Secretary of State will initiate an offshore licensing
round by advertising the available block(s), the criteria for as-
sessing applications and the terms which will be included in any
license.25 Once granted, a licence necessitates the obtaining of
certain consents and approvals from the relevant government
Minister at the Department of Trade and Industry, including
consent to carry out development and production operations,
26
consent to any assignment of license interests. 27 Also included is
approval of the terms of certain agreements between the licens-
ees, 28 particularly including JOAs and farm-ins, prior to com-
mencing operations.
From the first licensing round in 1964 until the fourteenth
in 1992, on-going refinement of United Kingdom JOAs has been
aimed the changing regulatory environment and changing per-
ceptions of the allocation of risks and responsibilities within the
JOA. For example, (although affecting the onshore, not off-
shore), the 1984 Petroleum (Production) (Landward Areas)
21 LINKIATERS & PAIraEs wenT CHRISTOPHER NIGrrINALuE, JOINT VENTURES (1990)
(Linklaters & Paines is a leading law firm in London).
2 DAINTITH & WILLOUGIY, MANUAL OF UNITED KINGDOM OIL AND GAS LAW 96
(1984).
21 Id. at 28.
2, Id. at 441 (1977).
" These terms will principally be the relevant Model Clauses.
" Model Clause 17 of the 1988 Regulations.
" Model Clause 41(1).
' Model Clause 41(5).
1992-931
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Regulations 29 have implemented a new licensing system in three
stages: Exploration, Appraisal and Development Licenses. This
new licensing approach necessitated extension of existing forms
of JOAs to cater to the additional license-related decisions to be
made, and to allow for the possibility of several licenses, each
deriving from the single original license, being held simultane-
ously, possibly with parties differing from the original licensees.
JOAs appoint one of the parties to the agreement as the
operator, some of whose responsibilities include to "conduct
and direct and have full control, of all operations"30 although
in practice the Operating Committee may have overall supervi-
sion and control. The degree of control by the Operating Com-
mittee over the operator represents a significant difference
between U.K. and North American practice. Arising from
BNOC's 1977 requirement to be able to manage its interests in
every joint venture in which it was involved but with limited
personnel resources, the U.K. JOA places the operator firmly
under the control and direction of the Operating Committee,
whereas the American model forms give the operator wider
discretion.
The operator acts as representative of the consortium and
coordinates its activities. The operator has the right to be re-
imbursed for any expenditure incurred on behalf of the opera-
tions (or, more frequently, to be funded in advance by cash
calls), and it is implicit, and generally also stated explicitly in
U.K. JOAs, that the operator shall neither make a profit nor a
loss from activities in that capacity.3
Under the Model Clauses of the license, the operator must
maintain records and accounts for inspection by the Department
of Trade and Industry; in the U.K., JOAs will normally impose
comparable obligations on the operator in favor of co-licensees.
An operator must also retain the document(s) of title, provide
S.1. 1984/1832; these regulations were superseded by the Petroleum (Production)
(Landward Areas) Regulations 1991 S.I. 1991/981. The latter also introduced a new
"Supplementary Seismic Survey Licence", but such can be held only in conjunction
with one of the three principal forms of licence.
o ANDREW B. DERMAN, JOINT OPERATINo AOREEMENTS: WORKING MANUAL (NAT-
URAL RESOURCEs LAW SECTION, AmaIlcAN BAR Assoc., MONOGRAPH No.2, 11 (1986).
31 Martyn David, The Pitfalls of Joint Operating Agreements 8 On & GAS: LAW
& TAX. REv. 180, 181 (1983).
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monthly statements of production and sales, pay royalties and
obtain insurance .
32
The JOA will normally require the operator to submit vari-
ous programs and attendant budgets to, and receive approval
from, the operating committee for each stage of the joint op-
erations. The operating committee may approve, alter or reject
programs and budgets. Once approved the operator will conven-
tionally be both authorized and obliged to implement the pro-
gram within the limits of the budget, although the JOA will
normally contain procedures governing budget overruns. The
JOA will require the operator to adhere to an accounting pro-
cedure using accepted principles of accounting and obtain ap-
propriate contract approvals and insurances.33
Appointment as an operator requires a skilled and experi-
enced person who must meet industry standards. Typically, the
operator must
conduct the operations in a proper and workmanlike manner
in accordance with methods and practices customarily used in
prudent oil and gas field practice and with that degree of
diligence and prudence reasonably and ordinarily exercised by
experienced operators engaged in similar activity under similar
circumstances and conditions.
3 4
Similarly, the CAPL Operating Procedure states "the operator
shall carry out all operations diligently in a good and workman-
like manner in accordance with good oil-field practice and in
accordance with the Regulations." Hence, the standard required
of the operator is in accordance with good oil-field practices"
which is akin to the broader "reasonable person" test.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Australian commentators suggest that the operator is an
agent under a typical Australian mining or petroleum joint ven-
12 However, other than statutorily required insurance, U.K., but not customarily
U.S., practice is for each JOA party to insure its individual interests separately.
13 Taylor et al., supra note 2, at 19.
Taylor et al., supra note 2, at 10; Clarification of the traditional "good and
prudent oil and gas field practice" is far from straightforward; the phrase is regarded
as including compliance with all recognized guidelines and standards, whether statutory,
regulatory, advisory or otherwise-e.g., the seminal standards issued by the Institute of
Petroleum would be considered persuasive in the U.K..
" For Canadian authority on this widely recieved point, see Morgan v. Sunray
Petroleum Corporation, 2 WWR 603 (1941).
1992-931
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ture agreement.36 In Canada, the operator of an oil and gas
property is in a fiduciary relationship with the non-operators.
37
U.S. authority suggests an operator is the agent of the parties
to a JOA and therefore owes them a fiduciary duty.38 Con-
versely, another U.S. commentator suggests that the overall re-
lationship between the operator and the non-operators under the
AAPL Form 610 Model Form Operating Agreement is not that
of agency.39
When operators hold property in trust for the parties or act
as their agent, they will generally be subject to fiduciary obli-
gations. 40 An old case states:
A "fiduciary relation" exists: (a) whenever the plaintiff en-
trusts to the defendant property ... and relies on the defen-
dant to deal with such property to the benefit of the plaintiff
or for purposes authorised by him, and not otherwise ... and
(b) whenever the plaintiff entrusts to the defendant a job to
be performed, for instance, negotiation of a contract on his
behalf or for his benefit, and relies on the defendant to procure
for the plaintiff the best terms available.
4'
Once fiduciary duty is established (defined in part by the terms
of the JOA, and with respect to particular transactions),
42 it
follows that an operator has specific obligations, namely:
(i) to disclose any personal interest he may have in the pro-
ject;
(ii) to account for interest on monies invested;
See generally Michael Crommelin, Australian Joint Ventures 4 J. ENER. & NAT.
REsouXcEs L 65 (1986).
11 Bank of Nova Scotia v. Soci6t G~n6ral (Canada) & Others, 58 Alta L.R. 2d
193 (Alberta C.A.) (1988); see also Midcon Oil & Gas Ltd. v. New British Dominion
Oil Co. 12 DLR (2d) 705 (1958); Pine Pass Oil & Gas v. Pacific Petroleums 70 DLR
(2d) (1966); Great Northern Petroleums and Mines Ltd. v. Merland Exploration Ltd. 36
ALBERTA L. Rv. (2 ND) 97 (1984); E. M. Bredin Q.C. Types of Relationship Arising
in Oil and Gas 3 ALBERTA L. REV. 333 (1964);, J.B. Ballem, The Scope of the Fiduciary
Relationship 3 ALBERTA L. REV. 349 (1964); D. A. MacWilliam, Fiduciary Relationships
in Oil and Gas Ventures 8 ALBERTA L. REV. 233 (1970).
11 Britton v. Green, 325 F.2d 355 (10th Cir. 1963); Reserve Oil Inc. v. Dickson,
711 F.2d 1951 (10th Cir. 1983).
31 E. E. Smith, Duties and Obligations Owed by an Operator to Non-operators,
Investers and Other Interested Owners, 32 ROCKY MT. MiNEAL L. INST. (1986).
BOWSTED ON AGENCY, 156 (15th ed. 1985 ).
4 Reading v. R, 2 KB 232 (1949) (per Asquith LJ).
41 Boulting v. Actat, 2 QB 606, I All ER 716 (1963).
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(iii) to exercise the accounting procedure diligently, in accor-
dance with general principles and with the JOA;
(iv) to maintain the utmost good faith to his co-venturers,
and not use his position to manipulate benefits for himself;
(v) to protect and maintain property, and not misuse it;
(vi) not to misuse information with which he has been en-
trusted by virtue of his position.
The High Court of Australia has held:
The critical feature of a fiduciary relationship is that the fi-
duciary partakes, or agrees to act on behalf of, or in the
interests of, another person in the exercise of a power or
discretion which will affect the interests of that other person
in a legal or practical sense.
4
1
One of the leading cases in this area is Lac Minerals Ltd. v.
International Corona Resources Ltd., ultimately decided in the
Supreme Court of Canada." Lac Minerals Ltd. was a senior
mining company while International Corona Resources Ltd. was
a junior. In 1980, Corona, owner of a group of mining claims,
obtained course and resulting assay results considered favorable
by its geologist who suggested the neighboring land owned by
Mrs. Williams should be obtained by Corona. Being a junior
company, Corona sought to attract investors. For this reason, a
site visit was arranged with Lac Minerals, a major mining cor-
poration, with a view towards making some sort of joint ar-
rangement. Negotiations never reached the point of contractual
relationships, but the meetings, correspondence and discussion
between the parties were crucial to a determination of liability.
The visitors were shown assay results, sections, maps and a
drill plan, and Lac's geologist informed them of the theory that
mineralized gold zone continued to the west on the adjoining
property belong to Williams. Two days later, in Toronto, Co-
l' Hospital Products Ltd. v. United States Surgical Corporation and others 55
ACR 417, 454 (High Ct. Australia 1984).
" Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd. 2 SCR 574, (1989),
61 DLR (4th) 14, 69 OR (2d) 287, 36 OAC 57, 44 BLR 1, 26 CPR (3d) 97; see also D.
W. M Waters, Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd. 69 CAN. BAR.
REv. 455 (1990). For recent insightful details on Canadian JOA's, see Edward Evans,
The Oil and Gas Operator as Fiduciary, 10 J. ENER. & NAT. RESaOURCEs L. 172 (1992).
The facts concerned a gold mine in Hemlo, approximately 150 northeast of Thunder
Bay in Northern Ontario. The case affects natural resource industry practices in the
handling of confidential information when visiting sites or negotiating the joint devel-
opment of property.
1992-931
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rona mentioned that it was actively attempting to acquire the
Williams property but no mention was made of confidentiality.
Three days after hearing Corona's full presentation, its prospec-
tor, who had earlier made an oil offer, was told by Mrs. Wil-
liams that she had received a competing offer from Lac. Corona
asked Lac to turn the property over and begin proceedings, but
Lac continued to proceed on its own to develop what turned
out to be the biggest gold mine in Canada.
The trial court found for Corona on the basis of breach of
confidence and breach of fiduciary relationship. It was found
that a a matter of fact that some of the information Lac obtained
from Corona was information Corona disseminated to the public
in order to obtain financial support was used by Lac to further
its own interests. The court also held that existing mining in-
dustry practice, concerning this type of information, suggested
that a party who received such information would not use it to
the detriment of the confiding person or company. The infor-
mation divulged by Lac's central witness was not preferred to
the credibility of Corona's witnesses, although it effectively un-
dermined Lac's appeal in the Ontario Court of Appeal and later
in the Supreme Court of Canada.
The trial court45 found Lac was a constructive trustee and
ordered that it hand over the mine to Corona, imposing a lien
upon the mine to secure monetary reimbursement to Lac for the
cost of purchase of, and subsequent improvements to, the dis-
puted property. The Ontario Court of Appeal4 upheld both the
liability findings of the trial judge and the remedy imposed.
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the trial judgement,
albeit on somewhat different grounds. The Court split, with the
majority holding that no fiduciary relationship arose between
the parties but with the Court finding Lac liable for breach of
a duty of confidence. Concerning the scope of a fiduciary duty,
Justice Sopinka, for the majority, concluded the key factor was
the vulnerability or dependency of the beneficiary on the fidu-
ciary. The majority disagreed both with the trial judge and the
Court of Appeal and found no fiduciary relationship existed:
We agree that the law of fiduciary relationships does not
ordinarily apply to parties who are involved in arm's length
25 DLR (4TH) 504, 53 OR (2nd) 737 (Ont. H. C. 1986)
44 DLR (4th) 582, 62 OR (2nd) I (Ont. C. A. 1987) (five judges sitting).
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commercial transactions. Nevertheless, it appears clear that the
law of fiduciary relationships does apply in certain circum-
stances to persons dealing at arms length in commercial trans-
actions.
47
Accordingly, it was a question of fact in each case whether the
relationship of the parties is such as to create a fiduciary rela-
tionship. The circumstances which give rise to such a relationship
have not been fully defined nor are they limited by any perma-
nent restriction.
The court in Lac identified three elements that must be
established to impose liability for breach of a duty of confidence:
(i) that the information conveyed was confidential; and
(ii) that it was communicated in circumstances where the re-
cipient realizes that such information is confidential and that
a duty of confidence accordingly arises; and
(iii) that the recipient, who should not employ the information
to the detriment of the confider, actually misuses it.
"A reasonable person" test was applied following Coco v.
A.N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd,4s where Justice Megarry explained
that when commercial information of a confidential nature is
disclosed by one party to another in circumstances that would
lead a reasonable business person to appreciate that the infor-
mation is confidential and to expect the recipient would respect
that confidence, the confidant is precluded from using the in-
formation for its own benefit without the consent of the con-
fider. Hence the "reasonable person" test considers whether a
reasonable person standing in the shoes of a recipient would
realize the information was given in confidence.
IV. CHANGE OF OPERATOR
Since JOAs may survive for a substantial term of years, a
mechanism is often included for resignation or removal of the
operator. Resignation typically requires 180 days notice, al-
though usually the operator may not resign in certain express
circumstances (as before completion of a specified task).49 The
JOA usually itemizes circumstances under which the operating
I d. at 635-636.
" Coco v. A.N. Clark (Engineers) Ltd, RPC 41 (Ch.D.) (1969).
49 For example, see the the Working Obligations of the (U.K.) Licence.
1992-931
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committee may remove the operator, and some U.K. JOAs will
allow the operating committee (generally excluding the operator
and its affiliates from voting), after a specified period of notice,
to remove an operator without showing cause.
The CAPL Operating Procedure allows replacement of the
operator in the event of:
(i) insolvency or bankruptcy;50 or
(ii) assignment by the operator of its powers and responsibil-
ities; or
(iii) the operator ceasing to hold a 10% interest; or
(iv) default by the operator as to his duties under the agree-
ment and failure to rectify same.5'
A contentious "Challenge of Operator" clause is set out in the
CAPL Operating Procedure, which takes effect in either of two
situations:
(i) another joint venturer can offer to conduct the operation
upon "more favourable terms and conditions" following which,
if operator is not prepared to meet the challenge, (s)he must
be replaced; or
(ii) after two years as operator, (s)he can propose to the other
parties new terms and conditions for his operatorship; a party
refusing to accept the proposal must offer to conduct the
operations on other terms and conditions and such a counter
proposal is treated as a challenge; however, neither provision
is usually found in U.K. JOAs.
2
V. PRODUCTION IN KIND
Typically, JOAs grant participants the right (and, in the
U.K., the obligation) to take production in kind and separately
dispose of their percentage share. This effectively gives each
joint venturer a separate interest rather than the joint one under
the license, and this is essential for U.K. tax purposes. One
advantage is that the interest can be used as security for borrow-
ing, and the provision is frequently found in U.K. JOAs for this
o Tri-Star Resources Ltd. v. J.C. International Petroleum Ltd et al. 2 W.W.R.
141 (Alberta Ct. Queen's Bench 1987).
51 1990 CAPL Operating Procedure CI.202. Clauses similar to this provision will
normally be found in U.K. JOA'S.




reason. For U.S. companies, this clause is extremely important
because it helps avoid anti-trust issues by highlighting the fact
joint marketing is not involved and helps in the taxation field."
"Underlift" occurs where a party fails to take all entitlement
to petroleum related to one's percentage interest. Whether the
party will later have the right to make up the underlift is the
subject of mixed practice. For example, the BNOC proforma
(which most recent UKCS JOAs follow) provides that where this
occurs, such portion will remain in the ground and will accrue
for the benefit of all the parties whenever it is later lifted. There
is, arguably, an element of penalty in this provision. This ele-
ment is not accidental, since the concept relates to the complexity
of lifting arrangements, particularly from the larger terminals,
and the disruption to the process resulting from underlift.
The CAPL Operating Procedure 199014 permits a party to
take its proportionate share of production in kind and separately
dispose of it and further states 5 that wherever a joint operator
fails to take entitlement in kind, the operator shall have the
authority to sell that party's share. Some Canadian operators
take the position they will not exercise that authority and would
leave the joint operator's reserves in the ground. But this is not
necessarily a proper interpretation of the clause. When oil and
gas are produced, for example, interest in the resources is owned
by the parties in their proportionate shares and it is not possible
to identify any one molecule of oil or gas as belonging to one
party and not to another.56 Thus ownership of oil and gas does
not arise until it has been produced.
57
VI. EXTENT OF A PARTICIPANT'S INTEREST
Like other JOA rights and liabilities, entitlement to produc-
tion in kind or proportionate revenues depends upon the classi-
" See generally LESA supra note 6, at 1-36.
CAPL Clause 601 provides that each party "has the right" to take in kind.
Clause 602 provides that whenever a Joint Operator fails to take in kind, the Operator
"shall have the authority" to sell that Joint-Operator's share. This authority is "revo-
cable by that Joint-Operator at will," yet effectively, if the Joint-Operator does not
have a buyer for that production then it is not possible for that authority to be revoked.
"Whenever production occurs, each Joint-Operator's share is also produced, and it must
be sold or otherwise disposed of in some manner." Id. at 4-5.
" Id. at clause 602.
56 LESA, supra note 6, at 1-36.
17 The U.K. position is that title passes from the Crown to the licensee effectively
upon its being produced at the wellhead.
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fication of a participant's interest. According to one
interpretation, an operator has authority to take all production
in kind and make arrangements for its disposal."8 As part of its
marketing efforts, the operator became involved in the promo-
tion of a fertilizer company which would use the gas, and
acquired a block of shares in the company. The co-venturers
claimed the operator held a proportion of the fertilizer compan-
y's shares in trust. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected this
claim however, on the ground the defendant's profit in the shares
arose only in its capacity as a promoter, and not in its capacity
as a co-owner of the gas field.
In formulating its opinion, the Supreme Court of Canada
created a working interest/carried interest dichotomy, 9 a dis-
tinction also recognized in the U.S.:
As used in the oil industry, the holder of the carried interest
of a working interest has no personal obligation for operating
costs while the co-owners who advance such costs are entitled
to reimbursements themselves first from future production.
... As the term was used here, it meant that the co-owners
who advanced expenses were entitled to reimburse themselves
first from the profits of the venture for equal distribution to
all shareholders was made.60
VII. AUTHORIZATION FOR EXPENDITURE ("AFE")
The AFE relates to the general programs and budgets of the
JOA but is more detailed, generally covering one discrete portion
of the operations. Use of AFEs tightens control over the oper-
ator's fiscal discretion, 6' allowing greater involvement for non-
" Midcon Oil & Gas Co. v. New Br. Dom. Oil Co. SCR 314, 12 DLR (2d) 705
(1958), aff'd 21 WWR 228, 8 DLR (2d) 369, affirming 19 WWR 317 (Alberta).
19 Carried Interest: A fractional interest in Oil and Gas Property, usually a lease,
the holder of which has no personal obligation operating costs which are to be paid by
owner or owners of the remaining fraction, who reimburse themselves therefore out of
production, if any. The person advancing the cost is the carrying party and the other is
the carried party. Three general types of interest recognised: the Abercromby - type
carried interest, the Herndon type carried interest, and the Manhattan-type carried
interest. WILLIAMS & MYERS, MANUAL OF On. & GAS TERMS, (7th ed. 1987).
" Byrd v. Smyth, 590 S.W. 2d 772, 775, 64 O.&G.R. 530 535 (rex. Civ. App.
1979) (citations omitted).
6, Monashee Petroleums Ltd v. Pan Canada Resources Ltd, 70 AR 277.(1986).
The content of an AFE was described by Justice Egbert: "An AFE should contain the
drilling commencement date, the location of the proposed well and the depth thereof.
The very nature of the words authorisation for expenditure, would require that the
estimated cost drilling, including completion costs also be included." Id.
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operators who might otherwise be treated as investors rather
than participants. The UKCS norm is for AFEs to require op-
erating committee approval prior to the operator making any
commitment, while the North American approach is generally
that AFEs are provided to non-operators more by way of infor-
mation and do not require prior approval. Some JOAs provide
for approval of an AFE unless the operating committee votes
against it within a specified time limit, but the practice of deemed
approvals is considered dubious by most UKCS practitioners.
In practice some operators will seek to minimize the number
of AFEs required by including as much work as possible within
a single AFE. This tendency should be firmly resisted by non-
operators, since it works against their interests by diluting the
primary purpose of AFEs. Namely it allows overruns on one
section of the work to be offset against underruns elsewhere.
Hence, an AFE compartmentalizes and controls JOA-related
expenditure.
To illustrate this point, suppose a drilling AFE identifies
well(s), geological formation and estimated depth, estimated costs
of drilling and completion, etc. On approval (where appropriate
or necessary), it commits a party to its proportionate share of
the necessary drilling and completion costs, unless the parties
mutually agree to terminate or vary drilling and completion
objectives. In Renaissance Resources Ltd v. Metalore Resources
Ltd 62 the Alberta Court of Appeal found that
[t]he AFE is a written manifestation of consent to participate
in an undertaking. Once consent is given, the joint operator
becomes liable for its share of the total costs of that under-
taking. 61
In Metalore, Justice Kidd applied the rule of law developed
in M& T Inc. v. Fuel Resources Development Co.,64 where Justice
Kane had determined a joint operator of a well could not go
I Renaissance Resources Ltd. v. Metalore Resources Ltd. 4 WWR 430, 31 Alta.
L.R. (2d) 226 (1984), aff'd 4 WWR 673, 38 Alta. L.R. (2d) 133 (C.A.) (Alta. 1985).
63 Id. at 443 (per Kidd J).("l find that Metalore agreed to pay its share (30%) of
the total costs of the test well to casing point and abandonment. It is of some interest
to note that the 1981 CAPL operating procedure requires a supplementary AFE when
costs incurred in a single operations are in excess of the capital AFE amount by 10%
... no such provision exists in the 1974 CAPL operating procedure").
1 518 F.Supp. 285 (D. Colo. 1981).
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"non-consent" at the time the cost estimate in the AFE was
surpassed and stated 6' that:
execution of the AFE by the non-operating owners of working
interests in the underlying leaseholds is a written manifestation
of their consent to participate in the well. It is axiomatic that
drilling costs cannot be estimated with certainty and that an
AFE is at best a good faith estimate. AFE's are usually ex-
ceeded, often by very substantial amounts."
In Canada an operator customarily submits a revised infor-
mational AFE6' if costs exceed 10% of the original AFE. This
does not occur in the U.K. where JOA provisions are much
stricter. But in the absence of gross negligence or willful neglect,
a non-operator is not likely to prevail in a suit to challenge the
reasonableness of costs in excess of an AFE.
One solution to cost overruns is to provide for automatic
non-consent by each operator on reaching, for example, 125%
of the original AFE. All costs would then be paid by the operator
who may then be afforded a right of indemnity for the extra
costs (with interest) before the non-consenting parties execute
back-in rights. The exact point at which the overrun is reached
is not critical because the non-consent is automatic. This places
a heavy burden on the operator to estimate the costs precisely
but it allows cost-to-date computations to be made with the
benefit of hindsight."
VIII. SOLE RISK AND CONSENT
Joint ventures are seldom an association of equals.6 9 Since
diverging opinions can arise among the participants, the oper-
ating committee passmark will be crucial and provisions are
0 Id. at 289-90
W6 here this may be the norm in Canada, it is certainly not so in the U.K., most
JOAs contain strict provisions preventing the operator from making commitments that
will take the total committed over that of the approved AFE without reversion to the
Operating Committee for additional approvals, Id.
1, Art. 11.12 1974 COPAS or Art. 11.15 of 1984 COPAS give grounds for challenge
of an AFE if excessive costs were not "necessary or Proper" or that the costs were not
"reasonable and necessary".
" J. David Heaney, JOA, AFE and COPAS- What They Fail to Provide, 29
ROCKY MTN. Mns. L. INST., §§7.43-7.83, 175 (1983). Such a solution is not known in
the U.K. in the authors' experience.
m Taylor et al., supra note 2, at 33.
[VOL. 8:49
JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENTS
invariably incorporated in the JOA to alleviate such problems.
These provisions can include "sole risk" or "non-consent" clauses
and will be based on the underlying principle of non-participa-
tion in an operation by at least one member of the group. The
difference in applicability between the two clauses rests on the
level of support a proposal obtains at the Operating Committee
stage.
A project will be "sole risk" when it was proposed to the
Operating Committee but failed to reach the passmark needed
in order for it to become a joint operation, and where less than
all the parties elect to proceed. A project will be "non-consent"
when it did receive Operating Committee approval but a party
exercises its JOA-given (if applicable) right not to participate,
thus shielding itself from both the costs and risks involved. The
latter clause is less common and is not included in the BNOC
proforma.
Sole risk operations accordingly allow one or more (but not
all) of the joint venturers to carry out an operation bearing all
the costs, concurrently being entitled to all the petroleum pro-
duced from that operation. The parties which opted out will, in
principle, not be entitled to the commercial benefits of such
operations. The JOA will normally include provisions allowing
them to back-in later, although usually on payment of a large
(as much as 15 times the backer-in's share of costs) premium.
Contractual complications arise in the event the operator is not
a sole risk party, and in such circumstances U.K. JOAs generally
provide for:
(i) the operator to opt out of acting as such; and/or
(ii) the sole risk parties to request the operator to stand aside.
Conversely, the AAPL model form provides for an initial well
which will have to be commenced by a certain date with unan-
imous participation. Thereafter, should any party wish to drill
any other well on the "contract area," it will be obliged to give
notice to the other participants of the proposed operation. Usu-
ally the latter will have 30 days within which to notify the first
party whether or not they wish to participate. The AAPL model
form envisages that the operator will carry out the work for the
consenting parties. The obligations created proscribe the rights
of co-tenants who drill on jointly owned property without the
benefit of a JOA. Each co-tenant can enter the land and drill
without the consent of other co-tenants, who cannot deny their
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right to enter the land. Similar provisions are to be found in the
CAPL Operating Procedure, which allow a party to carry out
an "independent operation" bygiving notice to the other parties.
IX. LIABILITIES OF OPERATORS
A. Liabilities to Third Parties
The question of operator liabilities in relationships with third
parties remains one of the most complex issues in JOAs. In
English law, this stems principally from the interface with the
law of agency. For example, the operator will normally be the
person who initiates transactions with third party contractors
and suppliers to insure that day to day operations are carried
out. The relationship between the operator and those third par-
ties is largely dictated whether by the operator's status is as
agent or as principal. This question of status is fundamental to
determining liability.
The answer to the question is to be found in the general law
of agency, rather than in any peculiarity of the JOA. Generally
speaking the operator will be regarded as an agent of the JOA.
For the operator's status to be that of principal rather than
agent will necessitate contracting as such without disclosing the
existence of the joint venture or of co-venturers. General prin-
ciples of contract apply as an important distinction is drawn
between a disclosed principal and an undisclosed principal whose
existence is not made known by the agent to the third party.
The latter is contracting with the agent with the understanding
the agent is and independent party, namely a principal in his
own right. Although in limited cases, the common law permits
an undisclosed principal to acquire rights and be subjected to
liabilities of a contract made by an agent, in most circumstances
this will not be so. In the petroleum industry, this situation
should not arise-thus, express or ostensible, agency law invar-
iably answers the question.
The result is the other JOA parties can sue and be sued on
the contract since the doctrine of privity of contract will not be
strictly enforced. In a practical sense, it is not relevant whether
the operator escapes personal civil liability; because of the nature
of the JOA, the operator will still be held liable to the extent
of this respective share under the agreement.
In cases other than those imposing civil liability, the operator
will usually be deemed to be a principal since the operator would
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normally be thought of as an independent contractor. The ques-
tion of non-operators' liabilities to third parties in such circum-
stances can be expected, at least in English law, to turn on the
extent to which the act or omission giving rise to the liability
has been authorized or subsequently ratified. In circumstances
other than subsequent ratification, the operator will be liable to
a third party on a contract but will have recourse against the
non-operators for their respective share under the agreement.
The BNOC proforma (and probably all current U.K. JOAs)
provides that each participant indemnifies the others to the
extent of their individual percentage interest share of any claim
or from liability to any third party arising from joint operations.
An underlying principle of the law of damages is that a
plaintiff will only be able to recover what he or she has lost
(i.e., damages are compensatory). In the JOA situation, the
losses of non-operators could not be taken into consideration,7"
except to the extent that (in English law) non-operators who pay
more than their proportionate share of any liability have a right
to reimbursement from their co-venturers. 7' Privity will prevent
non-operators from suing on the contract itself.
To circumvent this difficulty, the JOA imposes an obligation
on the operator to use his best endeavors to include provisions
in contracts to the effect that the operator is contracting as
principal but nevertheless can recover losses of non-operators
while at the same time precluding any action by the third party
in contract/delict/tort against them. 72 In such cases, third party
creditor rights against non-operators are limited. 7 Recent U.K.
experience suggests this position fluctuates with market forces,
with contractors and suppliers accepting such a limitation in a
recessionary period while rejecting it when the market has turned
their way.
,0 Woodar Investment Development v. Wimpey Construction, I WLR 277, 300
(1980) where Lord Keith expressed that it was time for a review of the inconvenient rule
that precludes a jus quaesitum tertio in English law.
"1 Civil Liability (Contributions) Act 1978.
7 This solution is considered uneven and arguably unfair by some UKCS operators,
but is conventionally insisted upon by non-operators.
" For a recent Alberta case, see Panamerica de Bienes y Servicos, SA v. Northern
Badger Oil and Gas Ltd., AR 575 (Alberta Ct. App. 1991) which considered whether
the cost of abandoning the wells should be ordered by the Energy Resources Conservation
Board to be paid out of the funds held by the receiver for secured creditors or out of
funds payable to the trustee in bankruptcy.
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A second way to avoid the conflict over damages is for the
operator to transact as disclosed agent (where following general
principles, contractual liability does not usually arise) and in-
clude a provision that the operator shall be liable on the contract
and the non-operators will not. The validity of such clauses is
not entirely clear since they have so far never been the subject
of judicial interpretation.
B. Liability to Non-operators
Another question concerns the extent the operator should be
liable to the non-operators, particularly as a consequence of
normally being precluded by the JOA from making any profit
as operator. This practice precludes any "financial cushion"
against the cost of mistakes. Despite this general principle, it is
clear that in certain circumstances, the courts will uphold pro-
visions in JOAs making the operator personally liable. For ex-
ample the AAPL model form provides74 that "the Operator is
exonerated from all losses sustained or liabilities incurred except
those losses which may result from gross negligence and willful
misconduct." Likewise, the position created by the BNOC 5th
round proforma is that, in general, the operator will only be
liable for loss which results from "willful misconduct."
"Willful misconduct" is conventionally defined as an "in-
tentional and conscious, or reckless disregard" of any provision
of the JOA or of a program of operations under the JOA "not
justifiable by any circumstances, but shall not include any error
of judgment or mistake made by any director, employee, agent
or contractor of the operator in the exercise, in good faith, of
any operation, authority or discussion conferred upon the Op-
erator." 75 The BNOC proforma ensures the operator is liable
only for "willful misconduct" or negligent failure to obtain
insurance.
However, willful misconduct is a defined term in the pro-
forma, thus removing much of the subjectivity from disputes.
On the other hand, "gross negligence" includes the "failure to
take even the slightest care," and this term was used in the U.K.
before the BNOC proforma was introduced. But, negligence is
an "on-off" switch that cannot be categorized into degrees since
At Article V.
Taylor et al., supra note 2, at 11; see also BNOC proforma clause 6.2.3.
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any adjective placed before the word makes no difference with
respect to liability.76
C. Environmental Liability
Development of environmental law in the U.K. in relation
to JOAs is in its infancy, since the key legislation 77 is only now
coming into force by gradual increments. Its initial focus is on
industrial production processes such as waste. Accordingly, U.K.
model JOAs, both offshore and onshore, have not yet been
adapted to the new r6gime.
Arguably, the question concerning potential liability for the
operator (acting as agent or principal) is of less significance in
this context. Practical reality dictates that the operator is in daily
control of operations and that the non-operators' state of knowl-
edge and degree of control be inevitably limited. The extent of
such knowledge and control will be crucial to the determination
of liability. For example, where a joint venture ships its oil
production from an onshore field to a remote terminal by road
tanker, the detailed logistical supervision of the tankers will be
at the site management level, not at the level of the joint venture
operating committee. Thus, liabilities arising in this context will
be those of the operator as principal, not those of the joint
venture through an operator's agency.
This conclusion is supported in Regina v Bata Industries
Ltd,71 a recent Ontario decision concerning pollution of soil and
groundwater by the local subsidiary of an international group.
Three individuals were charged with pollution offenses in con-
junction with the company: the Chairman (who was also CEO
of the parent company), the President of the company, and the
on-site Director/Manager. The Court considered the specific role
of each individual in relation to the company's operations. The
chairman was acquitted on the defense of due diligence on the
basis that responsibilities covered more than 80 subsidiaries world-
,6 Martyn David, supra note 31, at 181.
" Environmental Protection Act 1990
Queen v. Bata Industries Limited Quicklaw, Dominion Report Service, 92-00049
(Ont. Ct. Justice, 1992) (concerning offences (storage of leaking and foaming waste
drums) contrary to the Environmental Protection Act and Ontario Water Resources Act,
RSO 1980, c.361 §§ 16, 16(1), 16(2), 75(1)). The Court found no proper system in place
to prevent waste barrel disintegration and leakage. The Directors and managers who had
personal knowledge of the corporation's waste problem and who had worked closely.
with the particular location were found liable as directors.
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wide, that the chair visited each perhaps twice a year and that
the chair appointed experienced local staff to manage local op-
erations. The president was convicted on the basis knowldege of
the problem, taking no steps taken to remedy it, and having an
obligation to ensure not only that the on-site manager was given
appropriate instructions, but also to ensure that these were car-
ried out. Hence the president failed the due diligence test. The
on-site Director/Manager was convicted, whose defense resting
on alleged reliance of the environmental manager.
In its judgment, the court placed considerable emphasis on
the existence of internal reporting systems, documentary evidence
of due diligence and environmental reporting to the Board.
Accordingly, the principles of Bata can be applied to the JOA
if the Operating Committee is in the same position as the Chair-
man/CEO which meets monthly or quarterly to review joint
venture operations. Non-operators liabilities in this area are likely
to be limited. 9
X. THE DEFAULT CLAUSE
Default clauses contemplate the possibility that a non-oper-
ator may not be sufficiently funded to meet joint venture com-
mitments. Accordingly, the default clause may be one of the
most vital of the JOA clauses. Potentially serious consequences
for the progress of the joint operations can arise where one of
the non-operators fails to meet its share of a cash call made
under the JOA.
Early JOAs often proceeded on the basis that the non-
defaulters would have a lien over the defaulter's share of joint
property and joint petroleum as produced. Problems such as
this arose insofar as such a lien was deemed to constitute a
registrable charge and, if not registered within 21 days in accor-
dance with the U.K. Companies Act (1948 through 1985), it
could not be enforced against a liquidator or other creditors of
a defaulter. Also, as the lien attached principally to production,
it would be of little use where production had not yet com-
menced.
The modern form of JOA normally includes a "forfeiture
for default clause." Such a clause does not constitute a registra-
" While Bata is Canadian, its principles should be applicable in the U.K.; however
the more leonine U.S. statutory and regulatory regime may lead to a different conclusion.
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ble charge. The justification for this somewhat radical clause
was that nothing short of outright forfeiture of a defaulter's
interest would provide sufficient protection for the operator and
non-defaulters. 0 However, some Australian courts suggest out-
right forfeiture may yet be attacked as either as a penalty or as
interference with the rights of creditors in a liquidation.8' Mind-
ful of this, Australian and New Zealand JOAs conventionally
include provisions where the defaulter obtains some value from
the defaulted interest after settlement of outstanding obligations.
The clause will normally provide that, upon default, the
operator will be obliged to issue to the defaulter a "default
notice," and if default continues for more than a short period
(typically two to six days), the non-defaulters are obliged to
make up the financial shortfall immediately. Default is normally
remediable by the defaulter at any time prior to forfeiture of
the interest upon payment of the sum in default plus interest.
Where the default period exceeds a specified period of time
(typically 60 days), non-defaulters have the right to have the
defaulter's interest forfeited to them in proportion to their per-
centage interests. Where the amount received from non-default-
ing parties is insufficient to meet the shortfall, the operator will
conventionally possess the power to borrow the necessary funds
from outside parties and charge the costs to the non-defaulting
parties.
During the period when the party is in default, a suspension
of all its rights (but, of course, not its obligations) is in effect
under the JOA. For example, the party will not be allowed
access to any data nor representation on, or even attendance at,
the operating committee. Should none of the non-defaulting
parties wish to acquire the defaulter's interest, the JOA will
normally provide the operations shall be abandoned, with each
party, including the defaulter, paying each a percentage interest
share of the costs of abandonment.
Complex legal issues arise from the default clause. First,
where the defaulter is uncooperative in executing the necessary
documents to transfer its interest under the JOA (and under the
Taylor et al., supra note 2, at 11.
Mosaic OIL NL v. Angari Pty Ltd. (No.2) 8 AALC 780 (S. Ct. New S. Wales
1990) (per Young J); see also J. Waite & D. Dawborn, Contractual Forfeiture of Joint
Venture Interests: Are Such Clauses Enforceable?, II OIL & GAS: L. & TAx. REv. 389
(1990).
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relevant license) to the non-defaulting parties, the non-defaulters
have to use recourse to legal proceedings for specific perform-
ance, thereby wasting time and money. To circumvent this, JOAs
commonly include a power of attorney (usually in favor of the
operator) which, if framed properly, will be irrevocable. If so
this should transfer the interests to the non-defaulters. American
practitioners in the U.K. suggest that such power of attorney
might not withstand judicial consideration in U.S. courts, how-
ever.
As a general principle of law, moreover, a court will refuse
to enforce a contractual clause presupposing the payment of
money resulting from a breach of contract if the clause is re-
garded by the court as a penalty (as opposed to a proper attempt
to calculate compensation for the breach).12 The question then
arises whether the clause is a form of liquidated damages or a
penalty. If the clause is deemed to be a penalty clause, and this
is purely a matter of interpretation for the court, the result is
that it would be unenforceable in respect of that clause, although
the entire agreement would not be void. 3 The principal argument
that the clause is a penalty will be the fact the value of the
defaulter's interest may be greater than the amount in default.
Two cases illustrate these issues. In the first, BICC PLC v.
Burndy Corp.,s4 the defendant argued that a provision for for-
feiture of a party's interest in certain patent rights, if it failed
to pay its share of processing the patent, was a penalty. The
Court of Appeal held it was not, conceding that a provision for
forfeiture of property other than money nevertheless could be
interpreted as punitative.
In Jobson v. Johnson ,85 the Court of Appeal held a power
for the transfer of shares was a penalty. On the other hand, the
purpose of such a clause is not necessarily to secure performance
32 For instance, the parties may agree that the debtor shall pay a sum as liquidated
damages in the event of breach of contract. However, this sum must, at the time the
contract is made, be a genuine pre-estimate of the loss likely to flow from the breach
as opposed to being imposed in terrorem to dissuade the debtor from committing an act
of default. See Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. New Garage & Motor Co. Ltd.
A.C. 79, 86 House of Lords (1915).
11 Many U.K. JOAs incorporate a provision that operates to sever any clause
deemed void, illegal or otherwise unenforceable, from the rest of the JOA, thereby
endevouring to prevent voiding of the whole agreement consequent on one portion being
so deemed.
- I ALL ER 417 (1985).
81 1 WLR 621 (1989).
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by imposing a penalty but rather to provide protection for all
parties without which they would not be willing to incur the
large commercial risks prevalent in UKCS operations. A default
clause merely allows them, on having to finance a proportion
of the defaulter's liabilities, to have a corresponding increase in
their percentage interest.
Third, the relationship between the default clause and the
English legal doctrine of "equitable relief" should be considered:
previously a court could prevent the enforcement forfeiture pro-
vision from being enforced because it was not an equitable
remedy. However, since 1982, a different conclusion can be
drawn. An illustration of this can be found in Scandinavian
Trading Tank Co. AB v. Flota Petrolera6 where the plaintiffs
chartered a vessel to the defendent. The default clause stated
that if charterers failed to make payment of the monthly hire
installment by the due date, the owners could withdraw the vessel
from hire. The charterers asked the court to grant equitable
relief with respect to this form of forfeiture. The Court of
Appeal held that the doctrine did not apply to commercial
transactions where the parties had dealt with each other at arm's
length and had been of equal bargaining strength. It reiterated:
It is of the utmost importance in commercial transactions that
if any particular event occurs which may affect the parties'
respective rights under a commercial contract, they should
know where they stand. 87
The House of Lords upheld the decision although it issued no
specific dicta as to the courts jurisdiction in granting such relief
with forfeiture clauses. 8
However, in BICC PLC it was stated that the courts did
have jurisdiction to grant equitable relief regarding forfeiture of
parties' rights. 89 Since then, the courts will grant relief in situa-
tions where the clause is considered to be a penalty9° although
it is unclear what the situation would be with non-penalty clauses.
Commentators 9' note the unwillingness of the House of Lords
" Scandinavian Trading Tank Co. AB v. Flota Petrolera (The Scaptrade) 1 ALL
ER 301 (C.A. 1983).
Id. at 308 (per Robert Goff L.J.)..
Id. 2 A.C. 694, 2 All E.R. 763, (H.L. 1983).
BICC v Burndy Corp., supra note 84, at 427-428.
See Jobson v. Johnson supra note 85.
See generally, Taylor et al. supra note 2, at 54.
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to define the limits of discretion. Following the decision in BICC
PLC, it is unsettled whether English courts would be able to
grant equitable relief in such circumstances.
Even if English courts92 were to grant this equitable relief,
the effects would probably be minimal. Since most JOAs include
a 60-day grace period for remedying the default, the courts
would probably take that period into account in determining
whether or not to exercise the right. Scottish courts will normally
uphold an irritancy (the equivalent of the English term forfei-
ture) even where the results would appear to be harsh. An
example of this can be seen in Dorchester Studios (Glasgow)
Limited v. Stone.93
Finally, the question again arises whether such a default/
forfeiture clause is deemed to be a mortgage or a registrable
charge in security for money lent. The U.K. Registrar of Com-
panies has taken the view it is not and that such JOA provisions
need not be registered at Companies House as charges. However
a court may hold differently and it may be prudent to register
the particulars under the companies legislation. This however,
may affect relief against forfeiture as the defaulters may have a
stronger claim if it were treated a s such.
The forfeiture clause is not necessarily the only provision
available for default. Two other types, the "withering" and the
"purchase price" clauses, proceed on the same assumption, e.g.
that the defaulter should at least retain some benefit for the
money expended on joint operations before default. The with-
ering clause appeared in the 1970s when smaller companies be-
came concerned that they could be maneuvered into default. The
clause operates to the effect that the defaulter does not lose his
entire interest but can retain a reduced one, typically calculated
on the basis of his total monetary contributions related to total
joint venture costs. An advantage to this is less chance of such
a provision being regarded as a penalty clause. The "purchase
'2 Most U.K. JOAs use a forum selection (choice of laws) clause determining the
applicability of English law even in cases where the operations are conducted on the
Scottish continental shelf.
11 S.C. 56 (H.L. 1985) The case provided that sub lease of a shop provided
principal tenants were entitled to end the sub-lease if sub-lessees allowed any part of the
rent to be unpaid for 21 days past due date. Sub-lessees were bound to remove since
rent due at Martinmas (November 28th, 1972) was not paid until December 13th 1972
(the rent having been returned to the sub-lessee with notice that the principal tenants
intended to enforce the irritancy.
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price" clause, common in Australia and New Zealand, is based
on the assumption that the non-defaulters are obligated to pay
the defaulter the purchase price of his percentage interest, net
of sums in default. Another type of clause is the "cross charges"
clause where parties to the JOA could create cross charges over
each other's interests. This is arguably untenable, because it is
a slower and more complicated remedy to implement.
In Canada, the CAPL Operating Procedure makes provision9'
for the operator to have a lien on the interests of joint operators
in the joint lands and in production wells and equipment. Where
failure to pay continues for 30 days after a default notice has
been served, the operator has a number of options. For instance,
the operator can withhold information from the defaulting party,
or take an automatic assignment of the defaulting party's share
of production and joint property. Pertinent powers include the
right to sell a joint operator's interest in the joint land. The
proceeds of sale in this instance are to be applied, first to pay
costs of default, and second to pay any residue to the defaulter.
The question of equitable relief from forfeiture has also
arisen in Canada. The judiciary has, as in the U.K., managed
to avoid answering the question directly as to whether the courts
may be entitled to relieve the party of the effects of forfeiture
provisions.9"
XI. ABANDQNMENT
Abandonment remains one of the most pertinent JOA issues.
The U.K. position was significantly clarified by the Petroleum
Act of 1987 (referred to in this section as "the Act") which
made "provision for abandonment of off-shore installations and
submarine pipelines." The Act sets out the statutory framework
only and does not indicate the standard of liability imposed
upon persons who have obligations thereunder. However, it does
empower the Secretary of State to make Regulations to cover
all aspects of the abandonment of offshore installations or sub-
marine pipelines, although current U.K. governmental policy is
not to make any detailed regulations but to address each case
9 1990 CAPL Operating Procedure Clause 505
" In Wetter v. New Pacalta Oils 2 W.W.R (NS) 290 (Alberta 1989) Chief Justice
O'Connor refrained from commenting upon whether the instant case was one where
relief from forfeiture could be given under the Judicature Act, R.S.A. 1989 s.10.
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individually. The Secretary of State can, by written notice, re-
quire a person to submit a program setting out measures pro-
posed to be taken in connection with the abandonment of an
offshore installation or submarine pipeline. .
Licensees have no obligation under the Act to execute their
own agreement as to abandonment or include provisions relating
to it in the JOA, although there is some indirect encouragement
to do so. 7 The person who receives the Section 1 notice has a
statutory obligation to ensure the abandonment program is car-
ried out. Allocation of liabilities among the licensees is often
envisaged to be a matter for the parties to settle (i.e., within the
JOA or otherwise).98 The Act does state it shall be the duty of
each of the persons who submit the abandonment program to
ensure it is implemented.9
Modern JOAs incorporate provisions for abandonment ab
initio, typically requiring the operator to produce an annual
abandonment programe and budget, typically commencing with
an Annex B submission. 100 Furthermore, the scope of the JOA
must be expanded to include abandonment, and there are nec-
essarily drafting changes to the enumerated "standard," espe-
cially in relation to the main indemnity relating to a participant's
percentage interest share of costs and liabilities.
XII. SECURITY FOR ABANDONMENT
The JOA mechanics of abandonment differ little from those
affecting development; hence JOA provisions in this context are
minimal. In the context of a JOA executed now but operative
substantively only in the future. The possibility of a party being
unable to meet its share of abandonment liabilities is a worri-
some probability. For this reason, some form of security against
failure to meet such share of the costs is needed, the reason
being that if no such provisions were made, the other parties
would become liable to pay the defaulter's share with no prac-
tical recourse against the defaulter. The British Government itself
Section 1(1) Petroleum Act 1987.
Id. at § 3(2) & § 3(3)
" Current government policy is understood to involve itself in intra-licensee matters
only as a last resort.
Section 8 Petroleum Act 1987.
Im Submission of a Development and Production Programme for the Consent of
the Minister: Model Clause 17 (1988 Regulations) of the License.
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has indicated that while no such provisions are contained under
statute, it prefers that co-licensees should enter some form of
agreement to provide security101
Currently three broad approaches to security for abandon-
ment in UKCS JOAs can be identified:
(i) to include an "agreement to agree" where the clause will
state that the parties shall negotiate in good faith to execute
an abandonment security agreement before some future date
which is usually before a development programme is submitted
to the Secretary of State since this ensures the "momentum"
is present which encourages them to do so. 10 2 As a general
principle of contract law, an agreement to agree does not create
any binding obligations, but some JOAs nonetheless provide
sanctions for failure to abide by the "agreement to agree."
One possible provision is that the dissenting party can either
agree to become a party to the abandonment agreement which
others have already accepted or be deemed to have made a
"non-consent" election in relation to the development. A pro-
vision of agreement to agree in a JOA may also include pro-
visions pertaining to the sharing of liabilities, obligation to
provide security and the adequacy of security.10 3
(ii) to include provisions similar to those outlined in (i), but
to strengthen them by making it a default event for any party
not to have executed an abandonment security agreement prior
to submission of Annex B; however, and in relation to default
clauses, such a provision should be regarded with suspicion
until tested judicially.
(iii) to include a complete agreed abandonment security agree-
ment as a schedule to the JOA, requiring its execution prior
to submission of Annex B (typically with default attached),
and allowing changes to the agreement only where dictated by
statute or regulation, ie deliberately minimizing the scope for
re-negotiation.
The cardinal principles for laying down rules as to the nature
of a security are acceptability and flexibility. 1 No strict or rigid
rules should be laid down, as there are variable factors personal
to each company which make this rigid stance untenable. The
security to be provided must be acceptable to the other parties
10, Taylor et al., supra note 2, at 87.
I' Id. Appendix Clause 6.10.3.
,' Id. at 85.
I' Id.
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and one view is that, provided this requirement is met, each
company should have the right to choose its own type of secu-
rity. The contrary view is that each company should exhibit the
same type of security so that each incurs the same costs or
provision thereof.
The final point that arises is the situation where a company
fails to provide acceptable security, or the security provided
becomes inadequate or unacceptable. The simplest solution is to
treat the situation as analogous to default upon a cash call,
rendering the defaulting party liable to forfeit his interest. One
problem with this approach is the clause may be vulnerable to
attack by the courts as a penalty provision. Another problem is
forfeiture of a party's interests will only be of benefit when such
interest is of value. At the end of field life when abandonment
is necessary, the value of the interest will inevitably be substan-
tially lower than the liabilities which have to be borne.
XIII. CONCLUSION
Some solutions to the problems of the JOA on the UKCS
have been advocated'0 5 yet none of these provide all-or even
most-of the answers. While JOAs tend to be classified as
"black-letter" law subjects, they do not exist in a vacuum. Any
comparative study of joint operating agreements must recognize
that different legal jurisdictions invariably tackle similar physical
or technological problems in a diverse manner. Indeed, the ethos
of a particular jurisdiction is driven by various cultural, social,
political and economic factors.
Consequently, the law broadly reacts to these human factors
with a purpose that is often labelled as "public policy." As one
celebrated jurist suggests:
[o]n the other hand, in substance the growth of the law is
legislative. And this in a deeper sense than that what the courts
declare to have always been the law is in fact new. It is
legislative in its grounds. The very considerations which judges
most rarely mention, and always with an apology, are the
secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life. I
mean of course, considerations of what is expedient for the
community concerned. Every important principle which is de-
veloped by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of
"' Id. at 89.
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more or less definitely understood views of public pol-
icy .... 106
Hence, comparative law analysis searches for functionally equiv-
alent rules that attempt to solve the same problem or fulfill the
same role. Included here is the energy sector and the narrower
subject of JOAs.
Limits clearly restrict the validity of any comparative law
study. But these should not obscure similarities. American oil
and gas law has, to varying degrees, been persuasively received
in many jurisdictions partly because the petroleum exploration
and exploitation industry has been dominated by American cap-
ital and capability. The U.S. and Canadian oil and gas industries
are arguably the most sophisticated in terms of history, profile
and intensity of the regulations. Part of this success stems from
land tenure systems in Canada and the U.S., where a significant
proportion of the population owns real property rights to petro-
leum in situ. The implementation of public policy as an efficient
regulatory superstructure is thus needed in order to protect the
interests and expectations of petroleum producers, transporters
and distributors.
Joint operating agreements are the contractual nexus balanc-
ing exploration and production expectation interests against con-
flict with a particular regulatory r6gime. In the U.K., since there
are less players in the petroleum field than in North America,
this explains the absence of comparative judicial authority con-
cerning oil and gas joint operating agreements, as well as the
failure to adopt an industry wide standard form. Arguably, the
U.K. oil and gas industry has displayed less of an adversarial
and more of a conciliatory attitude toward dispute resolution
than surfaces in North America. Nevertheless, within the next
generation, it is clear that great creativity and inventiveness will
be required of the legal profession to devise new answers to the
most intractible problems of joint operating agreements.
'" OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 35-36 (1912); see also SILAs BENT,
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, 148 (1932).
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